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NOTES
THE “RATIONAL FEDERALIST”:
SYNTHESIZING NECESSITY AND
PROPRIETY IN THE SWEEPING CLAUSE
SHANE MAGNETTI†
Today, the United States Supreme Court’s Necessary and
Proper Clause jurisprudence sits cloaked in a mantle of
uncertainty. Beneath this cloak lies a slew of conflicting tests
which have left scholars befuddled as to the Clause’s true scope
and meaning. This confusion has generated feverish debate
among scholars with differing views of congressional power.
Unfortunately, within this battleground of competing viewpoints
lies no clear answer.
Despite this uncertainty, there can certainly be a more
pellucid and effective interpretation of the Necessary and Proper
Clause.
This Note will argue that flexibility as to what
constitutes a “necessary” law combined with a rigid standard for
what makes a law “proper” enables Congress to execute its
enumerated powers without overreaching.
Part I outlines
differing scholarly theories as to the legal origins of the
Necessary and Proper Clause. Sections A, B, and C outline the
theories that the Clause stems from principles of agency law,
administrative law, and corporate law, respectively. Section D
examines the implied powers theory of the Clause’s genesis.
Next, Part II examines the Supreme Court’s early Necessary and
Proper Clause jurisprudence—namely McCulloch v. Maryland,
the seminal case which set the Clause in motion. Part III
outlines four different categories of Necessary and Proper Clause
interpretation that the Supreme Court has recently espoused.1
†
Notes and Comments Editor, St. John’s Law Review & Journal of Catholic
Legal Studies; J.D., 2019, St. John’s University School of Law; B.S., 2016, State
University of New York College at Oneonta. Special thanks to Professor Marc
DeGirolami for his guidance and to the members of the St. John’s Law Review for
their dedication and support.
1
It is important to note that this is not a comprehensive historical examination
of the Supreme Court’s Necessary and Proper Clause jurisprudence—such an
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Section A examines two broad forms: the “Rational Connection”
approach and the “Chain-link” approach. Conversely, section B
examines two narrow forms: the “One-step” approach and the
“Federalist Restriction” approach. Finally, Part IV will argue
that a combination of the “Rational Connection” approach and
the “Federalist Restriction” is ultimately the soundest
construction of the Necessary and Proper Clause.
I.

LEGAL ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER
CLAUSE

The opacity of the Necessary and Proper Clause’s origin lies
in the lack of debate over the clause at the Constitutional
Convention.2 Indeed, records of debates over the clause’s scope
and meaning at the Convention are scant.3 The clause itself was
added by the Convention’s Committee on Detail, spearheaded by
James Wilson—a prominent lawyer from Maryland.4 Yet it was
not until the pre-ratification debates that the clause generated
meaningful arguments among the nation’s most eminent legal
minds.5 The ambiguity shrouding the clause’s roots has inspired
many legal scholars to ruminate as to its true origins, scope, and
meaning. For example, Professors Gary Lawson, Geoffrey P.

inquiry is beyond the scope of this Note. Rather, this Note examines several recent
Supreme Court cases that address the Clause for the purpose of categorizing its
interpretational modes.
2
Professor Randy E. Barnett offers a possible explanation for this lack of
debate: “if the power to make law was already thought implicit in the enumerated
powers scheme, then it is not surprising that the Clause would provoke no
discussion at the Convention.” See Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the
Necessary and Proper Clause, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 183, 186–87 (2003).
3
See Gary Lawson et al., Raiders of the Lost Clause: Excavating the Buried
Foundations of the Necessary and Proper Clause, in THE ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY
AND PROPER CLAUSE 1, 2–3 (2010) [hereinafter ORIGINS]. Moreover, scholars often
question the accuracy of the historical record itself. Some suggest that early reports
of the ratification debates are scant, unreliable, and possibly doctored. See Gary
Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A
Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 334 (1993)
(citing James H. Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the
Documentary Record, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1, 12–24 (1986)). In fact, early volumes of the
Annals of Congress “were based on the notes of Thomas Lloyd, whose reportorial
skills in 1789 were ‘dulled by excessive drinking,’ and whose manuscript was
‘periodically interrupted by doodling, sketches of members, horses, and landscapes,
and by poetry.’” Id.
4
See John Mikhail, The Necessary and Proper Clauses, 102 GEO. L.J. 1045,
1047 (2014).
5
See Robert G. Natelson, The Framing and Adoption of the Necessary and
Proper Clause, in ORIGINS, supra note 3, at 84, 94.
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Miller, Robert G. Natelson, and Guy I. Seidman contend that the
“Sweeping Clause” was painted with shades of eighteenthcentury agency, administrative, and corporate law, which
ultimately give Congress incidental authority to effectuate its
enumerated powers.6
Conversely, Professor John Mikhail
suggests that the framers used a different brush—one varnishing
broad strokes of implied and unenumerated powers stemming
directly from the all “other powers” provision within the clause
itself.7 This Part will examine each of these theories in turn.
A.

Origins in Agency Law

Professor Natelson suggests that the framers intended the
Sweeping Clause power to be exercised pursuant to fiduciary
principles of agency.8 The founders’ intent was “to erect a
government in which public officials would be bound by fiduciary
duties to honor the law, exercise reasonable care, remain loyal to
the public interest, exercise their power in a reasonably impartial
fashion, and account for violations of these duties”9—an idea with
roots embedded in the Lockean social compact.10 This fiduciary
ideal permeated the Constitutional Convention. Several of the
delegation’s most prominent figures, such as James Madison,
Alexander Hamilton, John Dickinson, and George Washington,
all considered government officials to be public trustees,
servants, and agents of the people.11 Moreover, most of the men
who drafted the Constitution were either lawyers with personal
fiduciary experience or businessmen who employed fiduciaries.12
Therefore, one may safely infer that the drafters were well versed
in the principles of the fiduciary duty and readily understood its
implications for government officials.13
One of the most salient fiduciary duties is the duty to follow
instructions and remain within authority. If a fiduciary action

6

See Lawson et al., supra note 3, at 5–6; see also Mikhail, supra note 4, at 1067.
See Mikhail, supra note 4, at 1047.
8
See Natelson, supra note 5, at 52.
9
Id. at 53.
10
Id. (positing that “the government ha[s] a fiduciary obligation to manage
properly what ha[s] been entrusted to it.”) (citing John Locke, The Second Treatise of
Civil Government: An Essay Concerning the True Origin, Extent, and End of Civil
Government, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 136, at 190 (Thomas I. Cook ed.,
1947) (1690)).
11
See Natelson, supra note 5, at 55.
12
See id. at 56.
13
Id.
7
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extends beyond its scope of authority, the reasonableness of the
action becomes irrelevant.14 This is particularly germane when
applied to the terms “necessary” and “proper;” if a law is not
properly within Congress’s jurisdiction to enact, it is irrelevant
whether the law is “necessary.”15 In both situations, the central
inquiry is whether the actor in fact has the power to act, and that
power is often determined by the doctrine of incidental powers.
In fiduciary relationships, the doctrine of incidental powers
is instrumental in determining the scope of a fiduciary’s
authority.16 This doctrine arises from the Quando aliquis maxim:
“[w]hen someone grants something, he is seen to grant also that
without which the thing itself cannot be.”17 Here, this means
that the fiduciary’s power stems from both an explicit grant of
authority and the implied powers incidental to effectuating that
authority.18 James Madison applies this maxim to the Necessary
and Proper Clause in Federalist 44:
Had the Constitution been silent on this head, there can be no
doubt that all the particular powers requisite as means of
executing the general powers would have resulted to the
government, by unavoidable implication. No axiom is more
clearly established in law, or in reason, than that wherever the
end is required, the means are authorized; wherever a general
power to do a thing is given, every particular power necessary
for doing it is included.19

This indicates that the Necessary and Proper power is an
ancillary means of using Congress’s other enumerated powers—
no more, no less. This interpretation is consistent with how the
maxim applies in fiduciary relationships.
For example,
incidental to the power to operate as a corporation is the power to
make bylaws.20 Ultimately, such powers exist whether they are
expressed or not, since they are incidental to the grant of
authority.21
All in all, Professor Natelson’s agency theory blends well
with the Necessary and Proper Clause—Congress is the agent,
14

See id. at 57.
See infra Part IV.B.
16
See Natelson, supra note 5, at 60.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 (James Madison).
20
See Natelson, supra note 5, at 63.
21
Id. at 64. (citing the maxim “Expressio eorum quae tacite insunt nihil
operatur– ‘The expression of those things that are silently inherent has no effect.’”).
15
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the people are the principal, and Congress must not exceed the
authority that the people have granted to it. Inherent in this
relationship is Congress’s fiduciary duty to honor the law, respect
the public interest, and exercise its power according to express
and incidental grants of authority.22
B.

Origins in Administrative Law

In addition to Professor Natelson’s agency law theory,
Professors Gary Lawson and Guy I. Seidman propose an
administrative law background to the Necessary and Proper
Clause. Since the Constitution is a public law charter, principles
of public administration help to elucidate means of constitutional
interpretation.23
One such principle—the “principle of
reasonableness”—facilitates the application of private agency law
in a public setting by requiring proportionality and impartiality
in public administration.24
The principle of reasonableness posits that delegations of
authority must be exercised reasonably.25 At its core, it is a
principle of statutory discretion; in seventeenth-century England,
it applied generally to all delegated authority to prevent
arbitrary and unreasonable exercises of power.26 Lawson and
Seidman theorize that this principle applies to Congress through
the Necessary and Proper Clause.27 They first note a structural
anomaly—that no implementational clause is found in Articles II
or III to enable the President or the Judiciary to take steps
necessary and proper to implement their respective powers.28
Rather, Congress alone is granted the power to implement
Necessary and Proper laws. Lawson and Seidman suggest a
reason for this—to avoid an argument that the principle of
reasonableness applies only to implementational rather than
legislative power, the drafters thought it necessary to codify such
a restraint.29 This is achieved through the Necessary and Proper
22

Id. at 53.
See Gary Lawson & Guy I. Seidman, Necessity, Propriety, and
Reasonableness, in ORIGINS, supra note 3, at 120.
24
Id. at 120–21.
25
See id. at 123.
26
See id. at 124. The principal of reasonableness had been “powerfully restated”
by English courts prior to the Constitutional Convention. Id. (citing Leader v.
Moxon, 2 W. Bl. 924 (1781)).
27
See id. at 135.
28
See id. at 126.
29
See id. at 135.
23
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Clause, which gives Congress discretion to assist in the
implementation of laws.
This theory is consistent with how the Federalists
represented the Clause to the public prior to its ratification. For
example, Alexander Hamilton opined that “the constitutional
operation of the intended government would be precisely the
same, if these clauses were entirely obliterated, as if they were
repeated in every article.”30 If the clause is indeed mere
surplusage, intended only to authorize those laws which serve
powers expressly enumerated,31 then Lawson and Seidman’s
theory fits with Hamilton’s language in Federalist 33.
If
Congress’s incidental powers would have accrued with or without
the Necessary and Proper Clause as Hamilton suggests, then it
necessarily follows that those powers would still be subject to the
principle of reasonableness, as Lawson and Seidman suggest.32
In both cases, the clause superfluously codifies the incidental
powers and limitations already inherent in legislative power.
Additionally, Lawson and Seidman employ a textual analysis
to conclude that the Necessary and Proper Clause is an ideal
vessel for incorporating the principle of reasonableness. They
maintain that the term “necessary” requires efficacy,
measuredness, and proportionality—all core aspects of fiduciary
law and the principle of reasonableness.33 Moreover, they
interpret “proper” as describing regard for rights, impartiality,
and a fixed scope of granted authority.34 Thus, it is through the
principle of reasonableness that fiduciary duties are extended to
the public administration of laws. Through this extension, one
can see the administrative law colorings which underlie the
Necessary and Proper Clause.
C.

Origins in Corporate Law

Professor Geoffrey P. Miller offers insight into the corporate
law background of the Necessary and Proper Clause. He
analogizes the Constitution to a corporate charter, as it sets forth
30

THE FEDERALIST NO. 33 (Alexander Hamilton).
See Natelson, supra note 5, at 97.
32
See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 23, at 135 (“If the principle of
reasonableness derives solely from the existence of delegated discretionary power,
then it would follow that the constitutionally delegated authority of Congress . . . is
subject to the same requirements of reasonableness as is the constitutionally
delegated authority of the president and the courts.”).
33
See id. at 141–42.
34
See id. at 142.
31
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powers and limits, grants privileges and rights, delegates
authority, and specifies its purpose—all functions of corporate
charters in the founding era.35 Moreover, Miller observes that
corporate charters from the colonial era were peppered with
terms such as “necessary,” “proper,” and other similar scope
provisions.36 This is a meaningful analysis in light of the
draftsmen’s familiarity with corporate practice.37
In his review of colonial era corporate charters, Miller found
that clauses limiting managerial bodies’ discretion were
pervasive.38
In these documents, governing entities are
authorized to make laws “as they shall think fit,” “as shall be
necessary,” and as “shall seem most convenient.”39 Limiting
vocabulary attached to such exercises of power include terms like
“proper,”
“expedient,”
“fit,”
“convenient,”
“advisable,”
“reasonable,” and “conducive to.”40 There is an uncanny parallel
between these terms’ use in corporate charters and in Necessary
and Proper Clause interpretation, in that the language pattern
always requires a fit between the ends recognized and the means
employed.41
This background proves useful when interpreting the
Necessary and Proper Clause. For example, Professor Miller
hypothesizes that just as scope clauses in corporate charters
convey no independent authority, neither does the Necessary and
Proper Clause.42 Rather, scope clauses in both contexts serve
only to modify delegated authority.43 For example, corporate
charters favored the term “necessary” over other limiting scope
terms in contexts restricting lawmaking or rulemaking power.44
Miller suggests that the reason for this was to protect against

35
See Geoffrey P. Miller, The Corporate Law Background of the Necessary and
Proper Clause, in ORIGINS, supra note 3, at 144, 146–47.
36
Id. at 145.
37
See supra text accompanying note 11. See also Miller, supra note 35, at 149
(“Given all this expertise, it would not be surprising if these men, when drafting the
Necessary and Proper Clause, had employed concepts that were also current in
corporate law practice of the time.”).
38
Miller, supra note 35, at 150.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 152–53.
41
See id. at 145.
42
Id. at 155.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 167–68. Miller found that the term “necessary” appeared most
frequently in the context of employment and rulemaking—two functions that can be
considered “fundamental to achieving the goals of the enterprise.” Id. at 167.
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broad grants of authority to corporate legislative bodies that
might otherwise contravene state or federal law.45
Miller’s suggestion fits well with the means-ends
construction: “[t]he term ‘necessary,’ when used as a limitation
on legislative authority in corporate charters, thus apparently
required that rules enacted for the governance of the institution
be reasonably closely adapted to achieving the goals for which
the institution was formed.”46 In the same vein, the term
“proper” serves a modifying function in corporate charters.
Miller found that the term “proper” appears most frequently in
contexts where shareholders’ interests are at stake.47 Therefore,
it makes sense that the term “proper” requires power to be
exercised with its effects on corporate stakeholders in mind.48
The parallel for the Necessary and Proper Clause is that
Congress must consider the effect of its laws on individual
citizens irrespective of whether the law is “necessary.”49
With these principles in mind, there is a compelling case for
the influence of corporate charters upon the Constitution.
Ultimately, such insight into the Necessary and Proper Clause
suggests that there is a limited scope to its power, and that
Congress’s delegated authority ought not to be exceeded.50
D. Origins in the Doctrine of Implied Powers
Professor John Mikhail, alternatively, takes a different
approach to the scope and meaning of the Necessary and Proper
Clause than Professors Lawson, Miller, Natelson, and Seidman.
Mikhail emphasizes that the Clause is composed of three distinct
provisions:
1. “Congress shall have Power . . . To make all Laws which shall
be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers”
2. “Congress shall have Power . . . To make all Laws which shall
be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution . . . all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the
United States”
45

Id. at 170.
Id. at 170–71. In this context the “means” refer to laws enacted in furtherance
of an enumerated power—the “end.” See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
47
For example, decisions to declare dividends, call meetings, levy a tax, set
salaries, etc. See Miller, supra note 35, at 173–74.
48
See id.
49
Id. at 174.
50
Id.
46
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3. “Congress shall have Power...To make all Laws which shall
be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution . . . all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in . . . any Department or
Officer [of the United States].”51

Of these three provisions, Mikhail contends that the second, or
the “all other powers” provision, is the most important one for
interpreting the Clause, yet scholars have largely ignored it.52
According to Mikhail, the “all other powers” provision is more
than just ancillary to Congress’s enumerated powers (its
“foregoing” powers); rather, it refers to implied or un-enumerated
powers embedded within the Constitution.53 Thus, “all other
powers” means more than just the incidental authority to carry
into effect Congress’s enumerated powers.
Under this
interpretation, the “sweeping clause” encapsulates a broad scope
of implied powers designed to give the government a vast
measure of flexibility.54
Mikhail draws support for this proposition from the fact that
many of the Clause’s drafters were strong advocates for implied
powers,55 especially after experiencing the crippling weakness of
the Articles of Confederation.56 James Wilson in particular (the
Clause’s primary draftsman) was an outspoken advocate of
implied powers, and he had often sought to bolster congressional
power with this doctrine.57 For support, Mikhail looks to the
fervent pre-ratification debate between the Federalists and
51
Mikhail, supra note 4, at 1046–47 (alteration in original) (quoting U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18).
52
Id. at 1047.
53
Id. Mikhail proposes that “[t]he existence of implied or unenumerated powers
is thus explicitly recognized by the precise text of the Constitution, much like the
existence of unenumerated rights.” Id. Note the tension of this view with Professor
Miller’s contention that “[t]he corporate law background suggests that the Necessary
and Proper Clause does not grant independent lawmaking competence[,] does not
grant general legislative power, and does not delegate unilateral discretion to
Congress to define whether a given action is or is not constitutionally authorized.”
Miller, supra note 35, at 175.
54
See Mikhail, supra note 4, at 1123. But see Barnett, supra note 2, at 192 (“The
only powers that are necessary and proper for the national government are those
that were enumerated; the only proper unenumerated powers are those derived from
the nature of a power that was expressed.”) (emphasis in original).
55
See Mikhail, supra note 4, at 1047 (“The second Necessary and Proper Clause
was intended . . . to declare and to incorporate into the Constitution the doctrines of
implied and inherent powers that [James] Wilson, Robert Morris, Gouverneur
Morris, Alexander Hamilton, and other prominent nationalists at the constitutional
convention had advocated throughout the previous decade . . . .”).
56
See id. at 1088.
57
See id. at 1061.
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Anti-Federalists. Whereas the Federalists argued that the
Clause was superfluous—a toothless provision that would have
applied to Congress even without its inclusion58—the
Anti-Federalists berated the clause as one granting Congress
“immense,” “unbounded” power.59 Given the robust debate
generated by the “all other powers” provision, one can infer that
the drafters understood the opaque and potentially dangerous
nature of this provision.
Significantly, Mikhail acknowledges and expands upon
Miller’s corporate law thesis. Mikhail probes James Wilson’s
background as a corporate lawyer and its potential influence on
his role in drafting the Necessary and Proper Clause. For
example, Wilson was a major shareholder and president of the
Illinois-Wabash Company, “a principal shareholder of the
Canaan Company,” and was immersed in both companies’
business and legal affairs.60 In addition, he was principally
involved in several other business affairs in a legal capacity.61
Furthermore, Mikhail offers examples of correspondence between
Wilson and his business associates that are laden with
concurrent uses of the terms “necessary” and “proper.”62
Ultimately, “[a]ll of these examples demonstrate that Wilson was
intimately acquainted with the phrase ‘necessary and proper’ and
similar language before he incorporated this phrase into the
Constitution while serving on the Committee of Detail.”63
Indeed, a corporate understanding of the Clause feels
compelling.64

58
See supra note 30 and accompanying text. See also Barnett, supra note 2, at
187 (“[A]ny ambiguity in the wording was clarified by the Federalists’ public
insistence during the ratification that the Clause only authorized the enactment of
laws that were incidental to the enumerated powers, and that this power would have
been inherent to the enumerated powers had there been no Necessary and Proper
Clause at the end of the list.”).
59
See Mikhail, supra note 4, at 1059–60 (emphasis omitted) (quoting An Old
Whig, No. 2 (Fall 1787), in 3 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 239, 239 (Philip B.
Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987)).
60
See id. at 1110–11.
61
See id.
62
See id. at 1112–13.
63
Id. at 1114.
64
However, this inference should be made carefully. Mikhail also notes that the
corporate inquiry is “merely the tip of the iceberg.” Id. He proceeds to argue that the
phrase “necessary and proper” was commonplace and comprehensible to most
common English speakers of this era, and also warns against the inference that the
phrase is a highly technical concept derived strictly from corporate law. See id. at
1115.
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In the end, only the Constitution’s draftsmen can truly know
the intended scope, meaning, and function of the Necessary and
Proper Clause.
However, inquiries into the fiduciary,
administrative, and corporate law influences behind the clause
shed light on its meaning. So, too, does a keen look at the
structure of the Clause itself and its key draftsman’s background.
Certainly, with so much to consider, it is no surprise that the
Supreme Court has struggled to espouse a truly pellucid
interpretation of the Clause. In the parts that follow, this Note
will examine the Supreme Court’s conflicting Necessary and
Proper Clause jurisprudence and categorize its dominant
interpretations.
II. EARLY SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE
The Supreme Court first addressed the Necessary and
Proper Clause in United States v. Fisher.65 There, the Court
upheld a bankruptcy law which gave the United States priority
over other creditors when debtors became insolvent.66 The case
gave Chief Justice John Marshall his first opportunity to
interpret the kinds of laws that the Clause covers.
Almost immediately, Marshall relaxed the meaning of the
word “necessary”: “[I]t would be incorrect . . . if the opinion
should be maintained that no law was authorized which was not
indispensably necessary to give effect to a specified power.”67
Marshall’s language is inharmonious with Madison’s conception
of the necessary and proper power in Federalist 44. There,
Madison imagined the quandary Congress would face without
the Clause, when “exercising power indispensably necessary and
proper, but, at the same time, not EXPRESSLY granted.”68
Marshall, on the other hand, employed far less stringent
language: “Congress must possess the choice of means, and must
be empowered to use any means which are in fact conducive to
the exercise of a power granted by the [C]onstitution.”69 Here,
the granted power was that of Congress to pay the debts of the
Union, and the Court found the bankruptcy act in question to be
a proper means of effectuating that power.70 In the end,
65
66
67
68
69
70

United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 396 (1805).
Id. at 384.
Id. at 396.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 (James Madison) (first emphasis added).
Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 396.
Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
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Marshall left the door ajar for a far more in-depth discussion of
the Clause.
This discussion arrived in McCulloch v. Maryland, the
seminal case for Necessary and Proper Clause interpretation.71
There, Chief Justice Marshall upheld the creation of the Bank of
the United States as a necessary and proper exercise of
Congress’s power to borrow money.72 In doing so, he elucidated
the Clause’s scope and its implications for congressional power.
Marshall explicitly noted that the power to establish a bank or
create a corporation is not enumerated anywhere in the
Constitution.73 He also observed that the power to punish and
the power to carry the mail are likewise not enumerated—rather,
they are both conducive to the exercise of granted powers.74
These examples illustrate his conviction that “necessary” does
not mean “indispensably necessary.”75 To read such unbending
limits into the Clause would render it toothless and leave
Congress with inadequate means to execute its enumerated
powers.76 Instead, Marshall averred that “necessary” simply
means “convenient, or useful, or essential to another
[enumerated power].”77 He found structural support for this
reading in Article I, § 10 of the Constitution, which prohibits
states “from laying ‘imposts, or duties on imports or exports,
except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its
inspection laws.’ ”78 The disparity between “necessary” and
“absolutely necessary” indicates that the draftsmen knew how to
create a rigid necessity standard and consciously refrained from
doing so with the Necessary and Proper Clause.

71
McCulloch v. State of Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). See also Gary
Lawson & Neil S. Siegel, Interpretation: Necessary and Proper Clause, NAT’L. CONST.
CTR. (last visited May 18, 2019), https://constitutioncenter.org/interactiveconstitution/interpretations/necessary-and-proper-clause.
72
McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 424.
73
Id. at 406.
74
Id. at 416–17.
75
This is the same argument espoused in Fisher. See supra notes 66–67 and
accompanying text.
76
McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 415. Marshall emphasized the importance of
a relaxed reading: “This provision is made in a constitution, intended to endure for
ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human
affairs.” Id. (emphasis in original).
77
Id. at 413.
78
Id. at 414 (emphasis in original). Marshall also notes that structurally the
clause is included in § 8, which describes the powers of Congress—not its limits. Id.
at 419–20.
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Although Marshall devoted much effort to probing the bank’s
necessity, he spent little time addressing its propriety. Just
because a law is “necessary”—incident to carrying into effect an
enumerated power—it does not automatically follow that the law
is “proper.” Despite the lack of discussion, this is a key takeaway
from what is perhaps the most perennial language in the opinion:
“Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist
with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.”79
The language here, namely “within the scope of the constitution,”
“appropriate,” “plainly adapted,” and “not prohibited,” speak
toward propriety.
Perhaps it becomes useful here to apply Professor Miller’s
corporate interpretation of “proper.” According to Miller, laws
must not “discriminate against or otherwise disproportionately
affect the interests of individual citizens.”80
Alternatively,
perhaps “proper” means “within Congress’s domain or
jurisdiction,” so as to not usurp the rights of states and
individuals, as Professors Lawson and Granger suggest.81 Either
way, Marshall’s “consist with the letter and spirit of the
constitution” language indicates that, if nothing else, “proper”
laws must not otherwise be in violation of the Constitution.82
After McCulloch, we are left with a muddied approach to
Necessary and Proper Clause interpretation. The takeaway is
that “necessary” and “proper” laws are those which are
convenient or useful to executing one or more of Congress’s
enumerated powers and do not otherwise violate the
Constitution. This is a nebulous inquiry that can easily be
stretched for the sake of argument. However, it is an inquiry
that has stood the test of time and continues to be interpreted to
this day. The next part of this Note examines how the Supreme
Court has both compressed and elasticized the Necessary and
Proper Clause after McCulloch.
79

Id. at 421.
See Miller, supra note 35, at 175.
81
See Lawson & Granger, supra note 3, at 271 (emphasis omitted).
82
See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421. Marshall addressed the holding in
McCulloch five years later in Osborn v. Bank of the United States. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
738, 860 (1824) (“The whole opinion of the Court, in the case of M’Culloch v. The
State of Maryland, is founded on, and sustained by, the idea that the Bank is an
instrument which is ‘necessary and proper for carrying into effect the powers vested
in the government of the United States.’”).
80
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III. CONFLICTING CATEGORIES OF INTERPRETATION
The Supreme Court’s Necessary and Proper Clause
jurisprudence has been mercurial throughout the years. With
several conflicting interpretations, there is no clear answer to the
question of the Sweeping Clause’s scope. Instead, the Supreme
Court has erratically given broad interpretations, narrow
interpretations, and many in between. This Part divides the
Supreme Court’s necessary and proper jurisprudence into four
different categories. Within the broad sphere lie the “Rational
Connection” approach and the “Chain-link” approach.
Conversely, the “One-step” approach and the “Federalist
Restriction” are in the narrow sphere.
A.

Broad Interpretations

Proponents of a broad interpretation of the Necessary and
Proper Clause generally argue that it encompasses a vast
amalgam of implied governmental powers that Congress may use
to legislate for the Nation’s general welfare.83 One possible hook
for this view is Madison’s language in Federalist 44: “No axiom
is more clearly established in law, or in reason, than that
wherever the end is required, the means are authorized;
wherever a general power to do a thing is given, every particular
power necessary for doing it is included.”84 This language lends
itself to a broad interpretation”—every particular power
necessary” casts a broad net. Additionally, there are textual
hooks in McCulloch that bespeak a broad construction of the
Clause. In particular, recall Chief Justice Marshall’s definition
of “necessary” as merely convenient or useful.85 As discussed
herein, this definition is crucial in cases that take an expansive
view of the Clause.
1.

The “Rational Connection” Approach

In Jinks v. Richland County, South Carolina, the Supreme
Court held that 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) was necessary and proper for
carrying into execution Congress’s power “ ‘[t]o constitute
Tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court,’ and to assure that
83

See supra Part I.D.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 (James Madison). Although the language itself might
imply a broad construction, it is important to remember that Federalist 44 was
written to assuage the fears of the Anti-Federalists that the Clause would give
Congress too much power.
85
See supra note 77, and accompanying text.
84
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those tribunals may fairly and efficiently exercise ‘[t]he judicial
Power of the United States.’ ”86 There, the Supreme Court of
South Carolina held that 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), which requires the
tolling of state statutes of limitations while cases are pending in
federal court, was unconstitutional when applied to lawsuits
against a State’s political subdivisions.87 The Supreme Court
disagreed and upheld the law as a valid exercise of the Sweeping
Clause power.88
To uphold the law, the Court applied a two-prong analysis as
to necessity and propriety. Justice Scalia, writing for the Court,
cited to McCulloch for its lax definition of necessity, and he
declared that “§1367(d) is ‘conducive to the due administration of
justice’ in federal court, and is ‘plainly adapted’ to that end.”89
Although not absolutely necessary, § 1367(d) provided an
efficient alternative to the mediocre options previously available
to federal judges in deciding whether to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over claims that would otherwise be time barred in
state court.90 Here, this was enough to satisfy the McCulloch
definition of “necessary.” In accordance with McCulloch, the
Court described the law as “conducive to the due administration
of justice.”91 Furthermore, as to propriety, Scalia opined that
§ 1367(d) was “plainly adapted” to Congress’s enumerated power
to constitute inferior courts, as “the connection between § 1367(d)
and Congress’s authority over the federal courts [is not] so
attenuated as to undermine the enumeration of powers set forth
in Article I, § 8.”92
The takeaway from Jinks is that a law that is an efficient
alternative to its predecessor is both “necessary” and “proper” so
long as its connection to an enumerated power is “not so
attenuated.” Congress is given significant latitude under this
86
Jinks v. Richland Cty., S.C., 538 U.S. 456, 462 (2003) (citations omitted)
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1). The power “to
constitute Tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court” is vested in Article I, § 8, clause
9 of the Constitution, and the “judicial Power of the United States” is vested in the
Supreme Court in Article II, § 1.
87
Id. at 458.
88
Id. at 465.
89
Id. at 462.
90
Id. at 462–463.
91
Id. at 462 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 417
(1819)); see also McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 418 (describing the power of
punishment as “a right incidental to the power, and conducive to its beneficial
exercise”).
92
Jinks, 538 U.S. at 464 (citing McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421).
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standard. However, nowhere does the Court mention anything
about implied powers. In this case, Congress is operating
pursuant to an enumerated power. In fact, the Court omits
language addressing Congress’s “foregoing powers” or “all other
powers” and instead inserts “Congress’s Article I, § 8” power
squarely into its recital of the Clause.93 Thus, although ceding
substantial discretion to Congress to carry out its ends, the Court
makes clear that it is dealing with enumerated—not
implied—power. Such is the nature of the rational connection
approach; Congress is given leeway in employing its means, so
long as there is a rational connection to an enumerated end.
The rational connection approach is also present in Gonzalez
v. Raich. There, the Supreme Court applied a deferential
rationality analysis allowing Congress to reach purely local
activity as a necessary and proper means of executing its
commerce power.94 A concurring Justice Scalia declared that “the
nature of the Necessary and Proper Clause . . . empowers
Congress to enact laws in effectuation of its enumerated powers
that are not within its authority to enact in isolation.”95
Additionally, Scalia expounded that congressional means must
be “appropriate” and “plainly adapted” to their enumerated
ends.96
The logical underpinnings in Gonzalez are similar to those in
Jinks. Just as the standard for necessity was lax there, it
remains so in Gonzalez. Scalia describes necessary laws as laws
without which the effective exercise of an enumerated power
would be undercut.97 In other words, laws are probative of
necessity if geared toward an activity that impedes the exercise
of a granted power.98 In both cases, the Court adhered to
McCulloch’s broad standard of necessity. Additionally, the
standard for propriety in Jinks is repeated in Scalia’s concurring
opinion in Gonzalez. The majority opinion in Jinks and Scalia’s
93

Id. at 461.
Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005) (holding that the Controlled
Substances Act was a necessary and proper exercise of Congress’s commerce power).
95
Id. at 39 (Scalia, J., concurring).
96
Id.
97
Id. at 36. Here, the standard applies in the context of interstate commerce.
Scalia looks to the Court’s ruling in United States v. Lopez, where it recognized that
non-economic activity “could be regulated as ‘an essential part of a larger regulation
of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the
intrastate activity were regulated.’” Id. (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
561 (1995)).
98
Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 36 (Scalia, J., concurring).
94
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concurrence in Gonzalez both define proper laws as “appropriate”
and “plainly adapted” to carrying out an enumerated power.99
Again, the inquiry calls for a rational connection between
appropriate means and legitimate ends.
Furthermore, the Court endorsed a strong application of the
rational connection approach in Sabri v. United States. There,
the Court upheld an Act of Congress proscribing bribery of state
and local officials who were involved in entities that receive
federal funds.100
Justice Souter, writing for the majority,
described the law as a necessary and proper exercise of
Congress’s Spending Clause power to appropriate federal money
to promote the general welfare.101 In determining the law’s
necessity, the Court relied on efficient alternative reasoning,
similar to that in Jinks.102 Souter opined that prior federal
bribery laws were inadequate for protecting federal interests,
and therefore Congress was acting within the scope of the
Necessary and Proper Clause.103
For support, the Court
portrayed McCulloch as establishing a “means-ends rationality”
for Necessary and Proper Clause inquiries.104 Moreover, the
Court claimed that to invalidate the law under the Necessary
and Proper Clause, the petitioner would have to prove that it
“‘ha[d] nothing to do with’ the congressional spending power.”105
This implies that only some nexus is required between the law
and an enumerated power—some rational connection to it. Only
without a rational connection can legislation fail under this
inquiry.
Ultimately, the rational connection approach falls on the
broad side of Necessary and Proper Clause jurisprudence. It
certainly gives Congress considerable discretion and flexibility in
passing laws that are “necessary.” To pass muster, laws must
generally be made in furtherance of an enumerated power by
either replacing prior ineffective laws as in Jinks and Sabri or
executing a larger regulatory scheme to prevent interference
with enumerated powers as in Gonzalez. As for “proper” laws,
they must merely be “plainly adapted” or “appropriate” to their

99

Id. at 37, 39; Jinks v. Richland Cty., S.C., 538 U.S. 456, 462, 464 (2003).
United States v. Sabri, 541 U.S. 600, 602 (2004).
101
Id. at 605.
102
See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
103
See Sabri, 541 U.S. at 606–7.
104
Id. at 605.
105
Id. at 608 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561).
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ends. All in all, the rational connection approach instills a
valuable measure of flexibility in Congress to “prescrib[e] the
means by which government should, in all future time, execute
its powers.”106
On the flip side, it potentially turns the
“necessary” inquiry into an accordion concept to be stretched over
any measure of legislation. However, it is certainly not the
broadest method of Necessary and Proper Clause interpretation
put forth by the Supreme Court.
2.

The “Chain-link” Approach

In United States v. Comstock, the Supreme Court upheld a
federal statute (18 U.S.C. § 4248) that allowed civil commitment
of sexually dangerous federal prisoners beyond the date the
Writing for the
prisoner would otherwise be released.107
majority, Justice Breyer laid out an extensive five-step test to
place § 4248 within the scope of the Necessary and Proper
Clause. First, Breyer recounted the breadth with which the
Clause permits Congress to legislate.108 Specifically, Breyer cited
Chief Justice Marshall’s standard from McCulloch—that
Congress may enact laws which are “convenient, or useful.”109 He
determined that whether a law is necessary is ultimately within
Congress’s purview.110 Second, Breyer cited to a long history of
federal involvement in this area.111 He recited several examples
of the federal government giving mental health care to civilly
committed federal prisoners.112 Third, Breyer contended that
Congress had sound reasons for enacting § 4248 in light of its
“role as federal custodian.”113 Here, the inference comes not from
106

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819).
United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 130 (2010).
108
Id. at 133.
109
Id. at 133–34 (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 408).
110
Id. at 135 (“[T]he means adopted and the end to be attained, are matters for
congressional determination alone.” (quoting Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S.
534, 547–48 (1934))). Additionally, Breyer sidesteps an inquiry into § 4248’s
propriety by declaring that “the present statute’s validity under provisions of the
Constitution other than the Necessary and Proper Clause is an issue that is not
before us.” Id. Instead, the Court assumes—but does not decide—that other
Constitutional provisions, such as Due Process, would not prohibit the statute. Id. at
133.
111
Comstock, 560 U.S. at 137. However, Breyer does note that “even a
longstanding history of related federal action does not demonstrate a statute’s
constitutionality.” Id.
112
Comstock, 560 U.S. at 137–140.
113
Id. at 142. Significantly, Congress’s “role as federal custodian” is mentioned
nowhere in the Constitution.
107
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the Constitution, but from the Restatement (2d) of Torts § 319,
which states that “one ‘who takes charge of a third person’ is
‘under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control’ that
person . . . .”114 Thus, § 4248 does not carry into effect a specific
enumerated power, but rather Congress’s common-law-derived
“role as federal custodian.” Fourth, Breyer argued that § 4248
accommodates state interests. The law requires the Attorney
General to encourage states to take custody of federal prisoners
encompassed by the Act, and also requires the federal
government to relinquish its authority when a State asserts its
own.115 Finally, Breyer noted that the law is narrow in scope—it
affects only a small amount of federal prisoners who are already
in federal custody.116 Therefore, it does not confer a general
police power on the federal government.117 Ultimately, amidst
these five considerations, the Court concluded that § 4248 is “a
‘necessary and proper’ means of exercising the federal authority
that permits Congress to create federal criminal laws, to punish
their violation, to imprison violators, [and] to provide
appropriately for those imprisoned.”118
Breyer’s inquiry in Comstock is a far departure from the
two-part tests discussed above to determine whether laws are
“necessary” and “proper.” The concept of a “chain-link” is
invoked here because Breyer, ironically, must “‘pile inference
upon inference’ in order to sustain congressional action under
Article I.”119 For example, without attaching § 4248 to an
enumerated power, the Court made several inferences to come up
with the “federal custodian power.”
After quoting the
Restatement (2d) of Torts for a Congressional duty to prevent
people in federal custody from harming others,120
Breyer
postulated:
If a federal prisoner is infected with a communicable disease
that threatens others, surely it would be ‘necessary and proper’
for the Federal Government to take action, pursuant to its role
as federal custodian, to refuse . . . to release that individual
114

Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 319 (AM. LAW INST.
1963–64)).
115
Id. at 144–45.
116
Id. at 148.
117
Id.
118
Id. at 149. Note that none of these powers are expressly enumerated in the
Constitution.
119
Id. at 146 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567).
120
Id. at 142.
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among the general public, where he might infect others. . . . And
if confinement of such an individual is a ‘necessary and proper’
thing to do, then how could it not be similarly ‘necessary and
proper’ to confine an individual whose mental illness threatens
others to the same degree?121

Note the string of inferences here. The Court goes from the
tort law duty of reasonable care, to the federal government
hypothetically containing quarantined federal prisoners, to
containing mentally ill prisoners who could hypothetically inflict
similar harm, to a federal custodial power.122 Rather than an
execution of enumerated power, we have a series of
inferences—hence the term “Chain-link.” At no point throughout
the inquiry does the Court mention which enumerated power
§ 4248 carries into effect. In vague terms, Breyer claims it to be
“the same enumerated power that justifies the creation of a
federal criminal statute,”123 without specifying exactly which
enumerated power that is. Ultimately, this is a very elasticized
approach. The Sweeping Clause power is stretched from those
laws, which are “convenient” and “useful” to the beneficial
exercise of enumerated power and not otherwise in violation of
the Constitution,124 to a five-factor balancing test.
This approach recurs in United States v. Kebodeaux. There,
the Court upheld the “Sex Offender Registration and Notification
Act” (SORNA) as applied to an ex-military member under the
Necessary and Proper Clause.125 SORNA requires federal sex
offenders to register in the state where they reside and applies to
offenders who have already completed their sentences at the time
the law was passed.126 Respondent, Anthony Kebodeaux, was in
the Air Force when he was convicted under the United States
Code of Military Justice for having sex with a minor;
subsequently, he received three months’ imprisonment and was
discharged from the Air Force.127 By the time SORNA was
When
enacted, he had already completed his sentence.128

121

Id.
Id.
123
Id. at 148.
124
See supra Part II (discussing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316
(1819)).
125
United States v. Kebodeaux, 570 U.S. 387, 389 (2013). Justice Breyer wrote
the majority opinion in this case as well.
126
Id.
127
Id. at 408 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
128
Id.
122

2019]

THE “RATIONAL FEDERALIST”

161

Kebodeaux moved from El Paso, Texas to San Antonio without
updating his registration, he was sentenced to a year and a day
in prison.129
In this case the Supreme Court had at its disposal two
enumerated powers it could have potentially used to uphold
SORNA as applied to Kebodeaux under the Necessary and
Proper Clause: the Spending power and the Military Regulation
power. The Court referenced a similar federal act—the
“Wetterling Act”—and implied that it was a valid exercise of
Congress’s Spending power.130 Although SORNA does feel far
removed from Congress’s power to spend for the general welfare,
the Government did offer this argument to the Court.131
However, the Court glossed over this argument and did not apply
it in its Necessary and Proper Clause inquiry. Second, there was
an argument that SORNA could apply to Kebodeaux by virtue of
Congress’s enumerated power to regulate the armed forces, since
Kebodeaux was an Airman at the time of his offense.132 Indeed,
the Court recognized this,133 but did not limit its analysis to the
combination of Military Regulation power and Necessary and
Proper Clause power.
Instead, the Court employed the five-factor “Chain-link”
approach used in Comstock. As in Comstock, the Court kicked off
by assuming without deciding that SORNA does not violate the
129

Id.
Id. at 391 (majority opinion) (“Like SORNA, [the Wetterling Act] used the
federal spending power to encourage States to adopt sex offender registration
laws.”).
131
Id. at 410 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas does not find the
Spending Power argument compelling. He contends that SORNA “does not execute
Congress’ spending power because it regulates individuals who have not necessarily
received federal funds of any kind.” Id. at 411.
132
See id. at 399 (majority opinion). Concurring in the judgment, Chief Justice
Roberts advocates this approach, and he suggests that “Congress had the power,
under the Military Regulation and Necessary and Proper Clauses of Article I, to
require Anthony Kebodeaux to register as a sex offender. The majority, having
established that premise and thus resolved the case before us, nevertheless goes on
to discuss the general public safety benefits of the registration requirement.” Id.
(Roberts, C.J., concurring). But see id. at 412 (Thomas, J., dissenting). “Kebodeaux
had long since fully served his criminal sentence for violating Article 120(b) of the
UCMJ and was no longer in the military when Congress enacted SORNA. Congress
does not retain a general police power over every person who has ever served in the
military.” Id. Furthermore, it is important to note that the Military Regulation
power is only in the conversation here because of Kebodeaux’s military service.
SORNA itself applies to civilians as well, thus it cannot be upheld in its entirety
under this theory.
133
Id. at 395 (majority opinion).
130
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Ex Post Facto or Due Process Clauses,134 thereby circumventing
any analysis under the McCulloch requirement that necessary
and proper laws must not otherwise be in violation of the
Constitution.135 The Court then proceeded with the Comstock
analysis. First, it noted the breadth of the Necessary and Proper
Clause, and it resolved that “Congress could reasonably conclude
that registration requirements applied to federal sex offenders
after their release can help protect the public from those federal
sex offenders and alleviate public safety concerns.”136 Second, the
Court observed that the Federal Government has a long history
of tracking federal prisoners to protect the public.137 Third, the
Court noted the government’s sound reasons for requiring
registration—to
protect
the
public
from
sex-offender
recidivism.138 Fourth, the law accommodates state interests
because it only encourages States to adopt its definitions and
requirements, rather than mandating them to do so.139 Finally,
the Court contended that the law’s application is reasonably
narrow because Kebodeaux was “already subject to federal
registration requirements that were themselves a valid exercise
of federal power under the Military Regulation and Necessary
and Proper Clauses.”140
As in Comstock, the Court relied upon a chain of inferential
reasoning. Here, the chain begins with Congress’s enumerated
power to regulate the armed forces.141 Through that power,
Kebodeaux was subject to federal registration requirements
under the Wetterling Act.142 Then, because Kebodeaux was
already subject to these requirements, Congress could rightly use
the Necessary and Proper Clause—under the five-factor
134

Id. at 389.
See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
136
Kebodeaux, 570 U.S. at 395. This is a source of discord for Justices Roberts
and Thomas, who both fear that “public safety concerns” could amount to a federal
police power. See id. at 401–02 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); id. at 412–13 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
137
Id. at 396–97 (majority opinion).
138
Id. This reasoning sounds somewhat like a recurrence of the “federal
custodian” role that the Court imagined in Comstock.
139
Id. at 398.
140
Id. at 397.
141
Id. at 394.
142
Id. at 391. The Wetterling Act imposed federal penalties upon federal sex
offenders who did not register at the state level. Id. The Court argues that under
this Act, the Attorney General delegated his power to designate sex offenses to the
Director of the Bureau of Prisons, who in turn designated the offense Kebodeaux
was charged with under the Code of Military Justice. Id. at 391–92.
135
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Comstock inquiry—to apply the modified yet similar registration
requirements of SORNA to him.143 Ultimately, this leaves us two
steps and five factors away from an enumerated power, which
was applied dubiously to begin with.144 The takeaway is this:
applying SORNA to Kebodeaux was not a necessary and proper
exercise of an enumerated congressional power; rather, it was a
“ ‘necessary and proper’ means for furthering [Congress’s]
pre-existing registration ends.”145
Notice what the “Chain-link” approach enables Congress to
do.
In both Comstock and Kebodeaux, Congress was not
legislating in a manner “incidental to those powers which are
expressly given.”146 Rather, it appears that Congress was acting
in furtherance of “other laws [it] has enacted in the exercise of its
incidental authority.”147 This gives Congress great discretion
under the Sweeping Clause. Ultimately, although this approach
does allow for flexibility in legislation, it is hard to imagine a law
that cannot be masqueraded as “carrying into Execution”148 some
other law which is in turn incidental to enumerated authority.
B.

Narrow Interpretations

Proponents of a narrow reading of the Clause find support in
the Federalists’ pre-ratification arguments. The Federalists
defended the Clause as superfluous.149 They contended that
legislation under this Clause could only serve expressly
enumerated powers.150 In fact, they averred that the Clause had
to be expressly tied to a vested power and that Congress drew no
substantive power from the Clause not already inherent in its
other enumerated powers.151 Alexander Hamilton, for instance,
viewed the Clause as “declaratory of a truth which would have
resulted by necessary and unavoidable implication from the very
act of constituting a federal government, and vesting it with
certain specified powers.”152 He assuaged the Anti-federalists’
143

Id. at 393–94.
See id. at 412 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
145
Id. at 399 (majority opinion).
146
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 411 (1819).
147
United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 168 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(emphasis in original).
148
U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 18.
149
See Natelson, supra note 5, at 106.
150
Id. at 97.
151
Id. at 116.
152
THE FEDERALIST NO. 33 (Alexander Hamilton).
144
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fears that the Clause would allow Congress to
by proclaiming that “[t]he declaration itself,
chargeable with tautology or redundancy, is
harmless.”153 As discussed below, narrow
Clause very closely to enumerated power.
1.
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usurp state power
though it may be
at least perfectly
readings pin the

The “One-step” Approach

The “One-step” approach is exactly what it sounds like.
Rather than leaning on a broad doctrine of implied powers or
employing a five-factor inquiry, this approach mandates that
statutes enacted under the Necessary and Proper Clause must
explicitly be in furtherance of one or more of Congress’s
enumerated powers. This approach keeps the Clause far more
compressed than any of the approaches examined thus far.
Justice Thomas’s dissent in United States v. Comstock is
perhaps the best articulation of this approach. Thomas responds
to the majority’s five-step approach by resorting to the core of
Necessary and Proper Clause jurisprudence: he breaks
McCulloch down into a two-part test. First, the law must be
directed toward an enumerated end; second, there must be a
“necessary and proper fit” between the law and the enumerated
power.154 Critically, this test establishes a bright-line rule: “no
matter how ‘necessary’ or ‘proper’ an Act of Congress may be to
its objective, Congress lacks authority to legislate if the objective
is anything other than ‘carrying into Execution’ one or more of
the Federal Government’s enumerated powers.”155
Under this inquiry, § 4248 necessarily fails because it is not
directed toward an enumerated power. Despite the majority’s
attempt to link it to “the same enumerated power”156 that gives
Congress the power to punish,157 Thomas contends that Congress
has the power to punish interference with an enumerated
power.158 Holding inmates past their release dates does not
address any such interference. Furthermore, Thomas rebukes
the majority’s notion that the “federal custodial” power derives
from the Restatement of Torts. He points out “[t]hat citation [to
153

Id.
United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 160 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
155
Id. at 161 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 18). Subsequently, Thomas
invokes the pre-ratification Federalist position that the Clause simply states what is
already implicit. Id.
156
Id. at 148 (majority opinion).
157
See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 416–17 (1819).
158
Comstock, 560 U.S. at 169–70 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
154
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the Restatement] is puzzling because federal authority derives
from the Constitution, not the common law.”159 Without an
enumerated power, § 4248 does not make it past the first step of
this approach; therefore, any further inquiry is redundant.
The “One-step” approach surfaces again in NFIB v. Sebelius.
There, five justices declined to uphold the individual mandate of
the Affordable Care Act as a necessary and proper exercise of
Congress’s commerce power. In part III(A)(2) of the opinion,
Chief Justice Roberts (writing alone) adopts a restrictive view of
the Clause, echoing Thomas’s dissent in Comstock.160 Roberts
begins by omitting the “all other powers” language from his
recital of the Clause, and inserting the term “enumerated” into
the McCulloch definition.161 Note the consonance here with
Thomas’s Comstock dissent—there must be an enumerated power
for Congress to invoke the Necessary and Proper Clause.
Moreover, Roberts expressly lays out the “proper” prong of the
McCulloch inquiry, which the Court bypassed in Comstock and
later in Kebodeaux; that is, laws that are inconsistent with the
Constitution are not proper, regardless of their necessity.162 This
fits markedly well with Thomas’s two-part interpretation of the
McCulloch standard: the law must fit with an enumerated end
and remain “consist[ent] with the letter and spirit of the
constitution.”163
Under the weight of this inquiry, the individual mandate
collapses. Rather than providing an incidental exercise of
enumerated power, the individual mandate “vests Congress with
the extraordinary ability to create the necessary predicate to the
exercise of an enumerated power.”164 This is because Congress is
not regulating economic activity here—they are regulating
inactivity.165 To allow Congress this discretion would yield
159

Id. at 173.
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus.’s v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 559 (2012).
161
Id. at 560 (“The power to ‘make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution’ the powers enumerated in the Constitution, Art.
I, § 8, cl. 18, vests Congress with authority to enact provisions ‘incidental to the
[enumerated] power, and conducive to its beneficial exercise.’ ” (quoting McCulloch,
17 (4 Wheat.) U.S. at 418 (alteration in original)).
162
Id.
163
Id. (alternation in original) (citing McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421).
164
Id.
165
Id. By allowing Congress to reach this far,
such a conception of the Necessary and Proper Clause would work a
substantial expansion of federal authority. No longer would Congress be
limited to regulating under the Commerce Clause those who by some
160
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potentially unbounded regulatory authority under the Necessary
and Proper Clause.
Ultimately, the “One-step” approach is a straightforward,
predictable, and easily applied test. Put simply, the primary
question is “pursuant to which power is Congress legislating?” If
the answer is not an enumerated power, then it is beyond the
scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause. Certainly, this feels
consistent with Alexander Hamilton’s position that the Clause
simply articulates that which is already implied in the
Constitution.166 Admittedly, it does not allow for as much
legislative flexibility as a broad reading of the clause—but it does
create well-defined boundaries and predictability.
2.

The “Federalist Restriction”

The “Federalist Restriction” mandates a reading of the
Necessary and Proper Clause that hinges largely upon the
meaning of “proper” and the scope of the Tenth Amendment. The
crux of this approach is that despite a law’s necessity, it must not
encroach upon state sovereignty. Federal laws that abridge the
sovereign immunity of the States are not “proper,” and therefore,
are not constitutional applications of the Necessary and Proper
Clause.
The Court sums up the Federalist Restriction succinctly in
Printz v. United States. There, the Court declined to uphold
provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act as a
necessary and proper exercise of Congress’s commerce power.167
The Brady Act required state law enforcement officers to conduct
background checks on prospective handgun purchasers, thereby
forcing state officials to participate in a federal regulatory
scheme.168 The dissent would have held that Congress’s power to
regulate handguns stems from its commerce power, and in turn
enlisting state law enforcement officers to carry out the Brady

preexisting activity bring themselves within the sphere of federal
regulation. Instead, Congress could reach beyond the natural limit of its
authority and draw within its regulatory scope those who otherwise would
be outside of it.
Id.
166

THE FEDERALIST NO. 33 (Alexander Hamilton).
Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 898, 923–24 (1997).
168
Id. at 898. The Court felt that doing so would upset the separation of powers,
by transferring federal executive power to thousands of state law enforcement
officers. Id. at 922.
167
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Act was a necessary and proper execution of that power.169 The
majority, however, refrains from applying “the last, best hope of
those who defend ultra vires congressional action, the Necessary
and Proper Clause.”170 Instead, the Court proclaims that laws,
whether they are executing an enumerated power or not, are not
proper if they violate constitutional principles of state
sovereignty.171 The inference here is that a law’s propriety
trumps its necessity.172 The Court finds support for this idea in
the words of Alexander Hamilton: “[The Brady Act] is not a
La[w] . . . proper for carrying into Execution the Commerce
Clause, and is thus, in the words of the Federalist, merely [an]
ac[t] of usurpation which deserve[s] to be treated as such.”173
Two years later in Alden v. Maine, the Court affirmed this
view.
There, the Court was asked to determine whether
Congress could subject nonconsenting States to private suits in
their own courts.174 The dispute arose when plaintiffs sued the
State of Maine (their employer) for violations of the Fair Labor
Standards Act.175 After their action was dismissed in federal
court, the plaintiffs brought the same action in state court.176
The Court ultimately sustained dismissal of the suit as a
violation of the States’ sovereign immunity, declining to
“conclude that the specific Article I powers delegated to Congress
necessarily include, by virtue of the Necessary and Proper Clause
or otherwise, the incidental authority to subject the States to
private suits as a means of achieving objectives otherwise within
the scope of the enumerated powers.”177 The logic here is
essentially the same as in Printz—regardless of a law’s necessity
or the scope of Congress’s enumerated powers, it must not
abridge principles of state sovereignty. In fact, the Court cites
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Id. at 941 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 923 (majority opinion).
171
Id. at 923–24.
172
Note the contrast between this approach and the “Chain-link” approach in
Comstock and Kebodeaux. In those cases, the Court does not address whether the
contested laws are “proper,” but instead focuses only on the laws’ necessity. Here,
conversely, the Court does not address whether the Brady Act is “necessary,” but
instead jumps immediately to whether the law is “proper.”
173
Printz, 521 U.S. at 924 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing THE
FEDERALIST NO. 33, at 214 (Alexander Hamilton) (M. Walter Dunne ed., 1901)).
174
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 730 (1999).
175
Id. at 711–12.
176
Id.
177
Id. at 732.
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language from Printz to emphasize the propriety of laws in light
of state sovereignty.178
A third articulation of the “Federalist Restriction” can be
found in Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Comstock.
Although Kennedy ultimately vindicates § 4248 as constitutional
under the Necessary and Proper Clause,179 he also voices an
insightful discussion of the Clause’s relationship to the Tenth
Amendment. Kennedy avers that if a congressional exercise of
Sweeping Clause power is constitutional, then it is not a power
reserved to the States, and the two are mutually exclusive.180
This comports with the “proper” prong espoused in McCulloch—
precepts of federalism molded by the “the letter and spirit of the
[C]onstitution,”181 indicate whether a law is in fact “proper.”182
Just as in Printz and Alden, there is a strong emphasis here on
the law’s propriety rather than its bare necessity. There is an
implication that “proper” federal laws cannot usurp the powers
reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment: “It is of
fundamental importance to consider whether essential attributes
of state sovereignty are compromised by the assertion of federal
power under the Necessary and Proper Clause . . . .”183
Ultimately, under this approach, inquiries into the
Necessary and Proper Clause are guided by principles of
federalism. Interestingly, they focus almost entirely on the law’s
propriety rather than its necessity. This places an effective cap
on the Clause while still retaining flexibility as to necessity.
Thus, Congress retains broad discretion as to its means, but
cannot elasticize the Clause so much that it impedes the States’
prerogative.
IV. THE RATIONAL FEDERALIST APPROACH
To this point, this Note has examined four different methods
of interpreting the Necessary and Proper Clause. Two broad: the
“Rational Connection” and “Chain-link” approaches; and two
narrow: the “One-step” and “Federalist Restriction” approaches.

178
Id. at 732–33 (quoting Printz, 521 U.S. at 923–24); see also supra note 173
and accompanying text.
179
United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 150 (2010) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
180
Id. at 153.
181
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
182
Id.
183
Comstock, 560 U.S. at 153 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Each approach has its advantages and disadvantages, but no one
alone embodies the full depth of the Clause. As such, it is
difficult to determine which is the true mantle of Necessary and
Proper Clause jurisprudence.
All things considered, the most accurate interpretation lies
not in one singular approach, but in a blend of the “Rational
Connection” and the “Federalist Restriction” approaches.
Although the former falls on the broad side of the spectrum and
the latter on the narrow, the two taken together provide a useful
balance of flexibility and restraint that could prove useful in
future interpretations of the Clause. This Part will argue that
the “Rational Connection” espouses the best interpretation of
“necessary,” and that the “Federalist Restriction” best dictates
which laws are “proper.” It is crucial that both prongs of the
inquiry be considered, despite the Court’s trend of locking in on
one or the other.184 Ultimately, a synthesis of these two
approaches creates the most efficient interpretation of the
Necessary and Proper Clause.
A.

Laws that are “Necessary”

The Rational Connection approach, although broad, provides
an effective mode of interpreting the “necessary” prong of the
Sweeping Clause. There are three important factors that make
this approach effective: it is consistent with McCulloch, it
embodies scholarly administrative and corporate law theories,
and it gives Congress flexibility in executing its enumerated
powers.
First, the “Rational Connection” approach as to necessity
hardly deviates from McCulloch. Remember, Chief Justice
Marshall broadly defines “necessary” as meaning not “absolutely
necessary,” but simply “convenient” or “useful.”185 Indeed, he
declares that necessary laws must be “appropriate” and “plainly
184
Alternatively, Professor Bray proposes that the clause could be interpreted
as a hendiadys—that is, a figure of speech in which two terms separated by a
conjunction form one single expression. Samuel Bray, “Necessary and Proper” and
“Cruel and Unusual”: Hendiadys in the Constitution, 102 VA. L. REV. 687, 688
(2016). For example, one might describe a cow as “nice and fat,” meaning only one
quality rather than that the cow is both “nice” and “fat.” Id. at 689. In the same vein,
interpreting the Necessary and Proper Clause as a hendiadys would eliminate
separate inquiries into necessity and propriety, and instead yield one inquiry into
the connection between congressional action and an enumerated power. Id. at 737–
38.
185
McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 413.
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adapted.”186 It is this very same language that permeates the
Rational Connection approach. In both Jinks and Gonzalez, the
Court upholds the necessity of congressional action as “conducive
to the due administration of justice,” “plainly adapted,” and
“appropriate.”187 Essentially, this is the standard McCulloch
contemplates.188 Without adequate discretion to carry out the
powers conferred to it by the Constitution, Congress would be
unable “to avail itself of experience, to exercise its reason, and to
accommodate its legislation to circumstances.”189 By rejecting a
rigid standard of necessity and allowing Congressional
discretion, the Rational Connection upholds the mantle of
McCulloch—as to necessity, at least.
Additionally, the discretion allowed in determining necessity
under the Rational Connection approach is consistent with the
administrative and corporate law theories of the Clause’s
origins.190 Recall Professors Lawson and Seidman’s theory that
an administrative interpretation of necessity requires efficacy,
measuredness, and proportionality.191 These qualities are all
embodied in the Rational Connection approach. The approach is
effective because it gives Congress ample leeway in executing its
enumerated powers.192 It is measured and proportionate as well
because it requires that acts of Congress be “appropriate” and
“plainly adapted.”193 Furthermore, the Rational Connection
interpretation of “necessary” is consistent with the corporate law
Recall Professor Miller’s
theory of the Clause’s origins.194
observation that the term “necessary” appeared in corporate
charters to protect against broad grants of authority to corporate
legislative bodies, and to require that enacted rules be
“reasonably closely adapted” to institutional goals.195
The
Rational Connection approach radiates this same sentiment. For
186

Id. at 421.
See supra Part III.A.1; see also Jinks v. Richland Cty., S.C., 538 U.S. 456,
462; Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 39.
188
See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 418.
189
Id. at 415.
190
See supra Part I.
191
See supra Part I.B; see also Lawson & Seidman, supra note 23, at 141–42.
192
See Jinks, 538 U.S. at 462 (declaring that the Court “long ago rejected the
view that the Necessary and Proper Clause demands that an Act of Congress be
‘absolutely necessary’ to the exercise of an enumerated power.” (emphasis in
original) (citations omitted)).
193
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 39 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring).
194
See supra Part I.C.
195
See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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example, in Gonzalez, Justice Scalia avers that under the
Necessary and Proper Clause it is critical that “the means chosen
are ‘reasonably adapted’ to the attainment of a legitimate
end . . . .”196 In both instances, there is a means-ends fit required
to keep the governing body’s power from going unchecked.
Finally, the Rational Connection approach is useful in
allowing Congress flexibility in its legislation. Certainly, the
framers anticipated some degree of flexibility to enable Congress
to carry out its enumerated powers. As James Madison wrote:
“Without the SUBSTANCE of this power, the whole Constitution
would be a dead letter.”197
Chief Justice Marshall, too,
emphasized the importance of flexibility in a government
intended to endure.198 The Rational Connection approach takes
this into account. By rejecting an unyielding reading of the word
“necessary,” the Court allows Congress to adapt accordingly to
both an ever-changing nation and an ever-shifting constitutional
gestalt.199 Indeed, Marshall recognizes this: “[The Necessary and
Proper Clause] is made in a constitution, intended to endure for
ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various
crises of human affairs.”200
That said, this approach must be taken carefully. As we
have seen, the Rational Connection approach is an accordion
concept and can be elasticized to allow Congress far more
regulatory power than intended.201 Such a broad reading can be
malleated to encapsulate a plethora of implied powers not
otherwise found in the Constitution.202 However, it is crucial to
remember that “the powers of the government are limited, and
that its limits are not to be transcended.”203 Thankfully, the
framers contemplated this by adding the phrase “and proper” to
modify the word “necessary.”
Therefore, it is absolutely
196

Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 37 (Scalia, J., concurring).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 (James Madison) (emphasis in the original).
198
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (declaring “we
must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding.” (emphasis in
original)).
199
See Lawrence B. Solum, How NFIB v. Sebelius Affects the Constitutional
Gestalt, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2013).
200
McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 415 (emphasis in original).
201
See supra Part III.A.1.
202
See Mikhail, supra note 4, at 1128. Mikhail concludes that “the Constitution
vests unenumerated powers in the Government of the United States—and that
Congress in turn is assigned the legislative authority to carry those powers into
execution, by enacting laws ‘necessary and proper’ to that end.” Id.
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McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421.
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imperative that courts do not forget the second prong of
the inquiry mandated by Article I, § 8, Cl. 18 of the
Constitution—that acts of Congress must be “proper.”
B.

Laws that are “Proper”

The Federalist Restriction, although a slim inquiry, accords
more weight to a law’s propriety than do the other three
approaches. This aspect of the Necessary and Proper Clause
inquiry is crucial for three reasons: it creates an ostensible cap on
Congress’s Article I power, it reflects the fiduciary and corporate
shades proposed by Professors Natelson and Miller, and it
remains homogenous with the Clause’s originally intended scope.
First, the “proper” cap only allows the sheets of necessity to
be pulled so far. In McCulloch, Chief Justice Marshall made it
abundantly clear that laws upheld under this Clause must “be
within the scope of the constitution,” and “consist with the letter
and spirit of the constitution”204 to be proper. Yet, time and again
the Court has upheld laws that are only remotely embodied in
the Constitution—if at all—under the guise of “necessity.”205
This is indeed foreboding for the principle “that ‘[t]he powers of
the legislature are defined, and limited.’ ”206
The Federalist Restriction protects against such legislative
overreach by ensuring that laws which purport to carry out
enumerated power are in fact proper exercises of congressional
authority that do not otherwise intrude upon the province of
states. As illustrated by Printz and Alden, laws that can be
stretched to reach an enumerated power nevertheless must be
struck down if they usurp state power or try to fit the states into
a federal mold.207 Rather, it is imperative that Congress does not
deviate from traditional precepts of federalism.208 Without due
respect to federalism, the “necessary” prong may be used to
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Id.
See e.g., United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 142 (2010) (deriving a
“federal custodian” power from the Restatement (2d) of Torts); United States v.
Kebodeaux, 570 U.S. 387, 412 (2013) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Congress does not
retain a general police power over every person who has ever served in the
military.”).
206
Kebodeaux, 570 U.S. at 415 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137, 176).
207
See supra Part III.B.2.
208
See Lawson & Granger, supra note 3, at 271 (positing that “proper” laws
must “not usurp or expand the constitutional powers of any federal institutions or
infringe on the retained rights of the states or of individuals”).
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jettison enumerated powers in favor of a broad conception of
implied, unenumerated power that permits laws merely for
convenience or usefulness.209 Critically, the “proper” inquiry
works as a bulwark to keep what is “necessary” from going
unchecked.
Second, the Federalist Restriction reflects the fiduciary and
corporate colors that Professors Natelson and Miller suggest
permeate the Clause. Recall Professor Natelson’s agency law
theory—if a fiduciary action extends beyond its scope of
authority, the reasonableness of the action is irrelevant.210 The
same concept applies in the Federalist Restriction. If Congress
legislates beyond its own powers and infringes upon the states,
the necessity of that action becomes nugatory.211 Indeed, to act
properly, Congress must not elasticize necessity to an extent that
transcends the Tenth Amendment;212 otherwise it breaches its
fiduciary duty to act as an agent of the people. Furthermore,
Professor Miller’s corporate theory is reflected under this
approach. Recall that Professor Miller observed the use of
limiting vocabulary attached to grants of power in corporate
charters213 and posits that such terms served to protect against
broad grants of power that could contravene state or federal
law.214 The Federalist Restriction approach does essentially the
same thing. “Proper” serves as a limiting function upon the
accordion concept of necessity to ensure that Congress does not
exceed “the just bounds of its authority and make a tyrannical
use of its powers.”215 Under both theories, it is essential that the
legislature does not wrongfully exercise powers it does not
possess.
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Id. at 331 (proclaiming that the Clause does not allow Congress “to regulate
unenumerated subject areas to make the exercise of enumerated powers more
efficient.”).
210
See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
211
See United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 153 (2010) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (“It is of fundamental importance to consider whether essential
attributes of state sovereignty are compromised by the assertion of federal power
under the Necessary and Proper Clause; if so, that is a factor suggesting that the
power is not one properly within the reach of federal power.”).
212
The Tenth Amendment states that: “The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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Finally, the Federalist Restriction accurately reflects the
scope originally intended for the Clause. After the Constitutional
Convention, there was strong push-back from anti-Federalists
who feared that the Necessary and Proper Clause would enable
the central government to abolish state legislatures, abolish state
taxes, destroy state governments, and eventually lapse into
tyranny.216 In response, the Federalists defended the Clause as
mere surplusage—as adding nothing to the powers of
government that was not already inherent within the
Constitution.217
For example, in Federalist 33, Alexander
Hamilton defended the Clause as “only declaratory of a truth
which would have resulted by necessary and unavoidable
implication from the very act of constituting a federal
government, and vesting it with certain specified powers.”218 He
believed that whether a law was proper “must always be
determined by the nature of the powers upon which it is
founded.”219 This is a clear indication that congressional action
pursuant to the Clause could only serve the powers expressly
enumerated. Hamilton presented the Clause as a superfluous
one that granted Congress no additional substantive power. In
fact, he averred that the Clause “though it may be chargeable
with tautology or redundancy, is at least perfectly harmless.”220
Conceptions such as these indicate that the Necessary and
Proper Clause was never intended to bestow vast implied powers
upon Congress.221 The Federalist Restriction ensures that it does
not. By championing the “proper” analysis, it ensures that “the
powers reserved to the States consist of the whole, undefined
residuum of power remaining after taking account of powers
granted to the National Government.”222
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See Kurt Lash, The Original Meaning of an Omission: The Tenth
Amendment, Popular Sovereignty, and “Expressly” Delegated Power, 83 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1889, 1895 (2008).
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See Natelson, supra note 5, at 99.
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THE FEDERALIST NO. 33 (Alexander Hamilton).
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Id.
220
Id.
221
See Lash, supra note 216, at 1895. But see Mikhail, supra note 4, at 1050
(arguing that the Clause “necessarily refers to certain implied or unenumerated
powers that the Constitution vests in the Government of the United States itself.”).
222
United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 153 (2010) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
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Ultimately, it is this limited scope of the Clause espoused by
the Federalists that might tend to taint McCulloch’s crown.223
Federalist supporters of the Constitution were steadfast in their
conviction that it only granted expressly enumerated powers to
Congress224—not the “vast mass of incidental powers” that Chief
Justice Marshall uncovered.225 Breaking from the traditional
representations of the Constitution’s advocates,226 McCulloch
embraced a broad conception of implied federal power.227 The
Federalist Restriction, however, restores a limited scope to the
Clause. By emphasizing the propriety of congressional action, it
ensures that Marshall’s “vast mass of incidental powers” is not so
vast that it usurps those powers reserved to the States and to the
people. This is imperative, since “the precepts of federalism
embodied in the Constitution inform which powers are properly
exercised by the National Government in the first place.”228
Ultimately, this often overlooked yet vital inquiry ensures
that Congress is legislating pursuant to its enumerated powers.
By creating a palpable limit on incidental power, reflecting the
fiduciary and corporate aspects of the Clause, and staying true to
the Clause’s scope as originally represented, the “Rational
Federalist” approach mandates an effective standard for
Necessary and Proper Clause interpretation.
CONCLUSION
Amidst four different categories of interpretation, there is no
predictable outcome for laws enacted pursuant to the Necessary
and Proper Clause. It is unclear whether they require a mere
223
See Lash, supra note 216, at 1891–92. Upon an original understanding of the
Tenth Amendment, Professor Lash argues that McCulloch is “almost certainly
wrong.” Id. at 1892.
224
Lash, supra note 216, at 1892.
225
See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
226
See Lash, supra note 216, at 1895 (noting that “advocates of the Constitution
assured the ratifiers in the state conventions that Congress would have only
expressly enumerated powers”).
227
Professor Lash frames the gravity of the McCulloch decision quite nicely:
Marshall’s construction of federal power has been embraced so widely and
for so long that it takes some effort to appreciate the radical nature of his
argument. So long as a law is ‘calculated to effect’ any of the objects
entrusted to the government . . . Congress could employ any means so long
as they were not ‘prohibited’ by the Constitution—regardless of the degree
of necessity.
Lash, supra note 216, at 1944 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
228
United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 153 (2010) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
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rational connection to an enumerated power, or whether they
must pass a five-factor inquiry; whether anything more than one
step away from an enumerated power is too much, or if a
necessary law may usurp state power. The answers to these
questions remain shrouded in ambiguity—but they do not have
to be.
There is a way to provide the flexibility required for effective
governance while preventing a potential leviathan.
A
combination of the Rational Connection and Federalist
Restriction approaches affords Congress an effective amount of
leeway as to necessity, all the while keeping federal power
reasonably compressed under the weight of propriety.

